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Abstract—Network-constrained dispatch decisions are not only
restricted by the thermal limits of the power lines, but also by
complex security requirements related to contingency scenarios,
e.g. the N-1-criterion. For real-world networks, the security-
constrained optimal power flow (SCOPF) leads to a prohibitive
increase in complexity even for linearized (DC) power flow
equations. This paper presents a set of methods for fast, yet
exact, SCOPF computation by reducing the power flow and
contingency constraints to a minimal subset. The constraint re-
duction is performed by an iterative algorithm with performance
guarantees based on both general algebraic theory and exploiting
peculiarities of the optimal dispatch problem. The method is
showcased on the classic IEEE 118-bus test system and on a full-
scale real-world system. The numerical experiments rely on open-
source software and data and our implementation is published
supplementary to the paper.
NOMENCLATURE
A. Sets
C Set of contingency scenarios with C = |C|
F(B, f) Feasible region of system (B, f)
G Set of generators with G = |G|
I,J Set of indices
L Set of lines/edges with L = |L|
Ln Set of lines connected to node n, Ln ⊆ L
N Set of nodes with N = |N |
T Set of time steps indexed with T = |T |
B. Parameters and Variables
dt Active power demand at t indexed by dt,n, n ∈ N
ft Active power flow at t indexed by ft,l, l ∈ L
f Maximum line capacity indexed by f l, l ∈ L
gt Active power generation at t indexed by gt,i, i ∈ G
g
t
Lower generation limit at t indexed by g
t,i
, i ∈ G
gt Upper generation limit at t indexed by gt,i, i ∈ G
xt Nodal injection at t indexed by xt,n, n ∈ N
xˇ, xˆ Asymmetric bounds on nodal injection
x, x Symmetric bounds on nodal injection
B Generalized power transfer distribution matrix
I Identity matrix of appropriate dimensions
LODFlc Line outage distribution factor for line l under c
M Mapping of generators to nodes
η Impact screening margin
C. Operators
|X | Cardinality of set X
X ◦ Interior of set X
X> Transpose of matrix X
Xi Row vector equal to the i-th row of X
Xij j-th entry in the i-th row of X
I. INTRODUCTION
Power flow physics and transmission limits constrain electric-
ity market transactions. With increasing uncertainty, mainly
driven by the proliferation of intermittent renewable genera-
tion, a precise calculation of securely available transmission
capacity can improve market efficiency and system reliability,
[1]. For example, in May 2015 the transmission system op-
erators (TSOs) of central western Europe (CWE) inaugurated
flow based market coupling (FBMC) to replace net transfer
capacities as cross-border trading constraints. FBMC includes
constraints imposed by critical network elements and outage
scenarios (contingencies), so called critical branches under
critical outages (CBCOs), [2], into its market clearing algo-
rithm, thus “bringing commercial transactions closer to the
physical reality”, [3]. As a result, TSOs were able to effec-
tively increase the system’s overall transfer capacity leading
to an improvement in distribution of renewable generation and
price convergence between the CWE market zones, [2], [3].
The identification of those CBCOs and power flow analyses
with contingency scenarios in general is commonly addressed
by security-constrained optimal power flow (SCOPF), [4].
However, given the large scale of real-world power systems
and the resulting number of possible contingencies, obtaining
a practical SCOPF is often obstructed by the dimensions
of the resulting numerical problem and its computational
complexity. While TSOs are primarily concerned with detailed
real-time solutions, economists and market analysts, on the
other hand, require robust and interpretable methods that can
accommodate time horizons of weeks, months or years, [5].
This paper proposes a method to identify a minimal set of
constraints that exactly represents the solution space of the
SCOPF problem, thus significantly reducing the computational
effort and enabling multiperiod market simulations that truly
internalize secure physical network constraints.
The efficient selection of relevant contingencies is the
central theme of classic and recent approaches to acceler-
ate SCOPF computation, [6]–[14]. An established iterative
method, e.g. [6], [7], [10], [12], solves a reduced base problem
and then tests the obtained solution for possible violation
of constraints inferred by contingencies that have not been
considered in the previous solution. If violations are detected,
the problem is solved again including those constraints and the
procedure restarts. The selection and order of constraints to be
tested can be decided, for instance, based on line loading, [6],
impact bounds, [8], or a ranking of corrective actions, [11].
An alternative approach looks for (steady-state) security
regions, [13], [15], i.e. a feasible set of nodal injection
vectors for which all imposed security constraints are satisfied.
Identifying or creating constraints that imply the satisfaction
of other constraints, e.g. [9], [10], [16]–[18], can point towards
constraints that have no impact on the problem solution and,
thus, can be dropped. In [9], [10] contingencies and their
related constraints are dropped if there exist dominant con-
tingencies that cause more severe violation of the remaining
constraints. The authors of [17] define bounds on the decision
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2variables of a security constrained unit commitment (SCUC)
problem and then identify constraints that are redundant given
those bounds. Similarly, [18] employs a relaxation technique
to define and identify constraints that do not influence the
feasible region of the problem, i.e. that are inactive.
The constraint sets studied in approaches [6]–[13] depend
on a specific SCOPF solution, i.e. a specific set of input
parameters (e.g. demand vectors) or objective functions. Al-
ternatively, [14], [19], [20] propose the notion of umbrella
contingencies. This contingency (sub)set contains the most
restrictive outages that cover for all other possible outages
implictly and is independent of the structure of the objective
or additional constraints. Solving the SCOPF with this subset
of contingencies, has been shown to significantly reduce the
calculation time, but identifying this set still poses some
challenges. Network partitioning to enable parallel compu-
tation, [14], and approximate pre-processing, [19], has been
proposed to improve umbrella constraint discovery. However,
these approaches require an additional layer of implementation
and the results are sensitive to the partitioning method. In [20]
neural networks are proposed to predict umbrella constraints
if system conditions change, but this requires previous identi-
fication of training sets.
This paper proposes a new set of methods to improve the
computational tractability of SCOPF problems by identifying
and removing redundant constraints. The main contributions
are as follows:
1) Similar to [14], [19] we propose a method to identify a
minimal set of essential constraints that exactly represents
the feasible region of the SCOPF. However, relative to
[14], [19] we improve the discovery of essential con-
straints by leveraging a geometric algorithm based on [21]
that avoids additional preprocessing and robustly scales
towards large real-world systems.
2) We propose the notion of conditional essential constraints
to further reduce the set of constraints. These constraints
are essential under the condition that the nodal injection
at each node does not exceed predefined limits.
3) We show that computational complexity can be further
reduced by ignoring the impact of contingencies on line
flows below a certain threshold. We show that this ap-
proach relates directly to the common operational practice
of security margins and discuss the threshold choice.
4) The proposed methods have been implemented in an
open-source framework that readily supports input from
MatPower and Open-Power-System-Data and can be
downloaded from [22].
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this paper we consider a preventive SCOPF problem on
multiple time steps t ∈ T . As common for this type of
analyses we leverage the DC power flow approximation, [4],
[14], to derive a linear relationship between nodal active power
injections, contingencies and line flows.
A. Power Flow Preliminaries
The physical network is represented by the set of nodes N
with N = |N |, the set of generators G with G = |G| and the
set of lines L with L = |L|. Vector gt indexed by gt,i ≥ 0
denotes the active power generation of each generator i and
vector dt indexed by dt,n ≤ 0 denotes the aggregated active
demand at each node n ∈ N at time t. At every time t the
vector of nodal injections is given by
xt = dt +Mgt (1)
indexed by xt,n where M is a mapping of generators to
nodes. Upper and lower generation limits are given by gt
and g
t
indexed by gt,i and gt,i respectvely. Each line l ∈ L
is a directed connection with arbitrary but fixed orientation
between one sending node s and one receiving node r. At
each time t positive flow ft,l ≥ 0 indicates active power flow
from s to r and negative flow ft,l ≤ 0 indicates active power
flow from r to s over line l. For all l ∈ L the power flows are
collected in the vector ft indexed by ft,l and the line capacities
are given by vector f indexed by f l. The physical power
flow equations are approximated by power transfer distribution
factors (PTDFs) where the PTDF matrix B0 ∈ RL×N is a
linear mapping of nodal injections xt to power flows ft such
that:
ft = B
0xt. (2)
We refer the interested reader to Appendix A for a derivation
of the PTDF matrix. Superscript 0 denotes the base-case
PTDF, i.e. the pre-contingency (N-0) case without any outages.
B. Contingency Preliminaries
Consider a contingency scenario c such that c ⊆ L is the set
of one or multiple lines that experience an unplanned outage.
The post-contingency flow along any line l /∈ c is determined
by line outage distribution factor LODFlc ∈ R such that:
f ct,l = f
0
t,l + LODFlc f
0
t,c, (3)
where f ct,l is the flow on line l in outage scenario c, and f
0
t,l is
the pre-contingency flow on line l and f0t,c is the vector of pre-
contingency line flows of lines c at time t. Note that LODFlc
can be either positive or negative. For the derivations of the
LODFs we refer the interested reader to Appendix B. For
every possible contingency c ∈ C indexed by c = {1, ..., C}
we use these sensitivity factors to define contingency-PTDF
matrices Bc as:
Bc = B0 +

LODF1cB
0
c
LODF2cB
0
c
...
LODFLcB
0
c
 , ∀c ∈ C, (4)
where B0c is the L × |c| matrix collecting the rows of B0
corresponding to the outages in c. Given a vector of nodal
injections xt the resulting post-contingency power flows after
outage c can be computed as:
f ct = B
cxt. (5)
Remark 1. Other types of contingencies, e.g. generator out-
ages, allow similar representations in terms of line flow sensi-
tivities, [17], and the formulations and methodology proposed
in this paper can be extended to accommodate them.
C. Security Constrained Optimal Power Flow
We consider a multi-period preventive OPF problem given by:
min
g,x
∑
t∈T
C(gt) (6a)
3s.t. dt +Mgt = xt ∀t ∈ T (6b)
e>xt = 0 ∀t ∈ T (6c)
g
t
≤ gt ≤ gt ∀t ∈ T (6d)
− f0 ≤ B0xt ≤ f0 ∀t ∈ T (6e)
− f c ≤ Bcxt ≤ f c ∀t ∈ T ,∀c ∈ C. (6f)
Objective (6a) minimizes the cost of generation given by cost-
function C(gt). Eqs. (6b) and (6c) enforce the nodal and global
energy balances. Eq. (6d) imposes limits on the active power
output of the generators. Eqs. (6e) and (6f) enforce that no line
is overloaded due to the resulting power flow for the base case
and every contingency. Thus, (6e) and (6f) define the feasible
region of nodal injections given base and contingency PTDFs,
and the thermal line flow limits is given as:
F(B, f) = {x : −f ≤ Bx ≤ f}, (7)
where
B =

B0
B1
...
BC
 , f¯ =

f¯0
f¯1
...
f¯C
 . (8)
Using (7), (8) the following formulation is equivalent to (6):
min
∑
t∈T
C(gt) (9a)
s.t. (6b)–(6d) (9b)
xt ∈ F(B, f) ∀t ∈ T . (9c)
Note that (9) can be extended to accommodate more complex
problems, e.g. security constrained unit commitment, without
changing (9c).
To reflect the upper and lower bounds of feasible region
F(B, f), each PTDF matrix B0, . . . , BC introduces 2L linear
inequalities to the problem. Thus, even the least complex set of
N-1 contingencies, i.e. only one simultaneous outage, requires
2L(L+1) inequalities to define feasible region F(B, f). Fur-
thermore, this set of inequalities has to be evaluated for every
time step t to solve (6). Therefore, the resulting problem size
quickly becomes computationally intractable with increasing
system size and more complex contingency scenarios. How-
ever, it has been shown that only a subset of these inequalities
is necessary to sufficiently define F(B, f), [10], [14], thus
reducing computational complexity. In the following section
we propose a procedure that efficiently discovers the minimal
set of inequalities based on endogenous model parameters and
exogenous data characteristics.
III. REDUNDANCY SCREENING
We consider the set of feasible solutions (feasible region)
F(B, f) to a linear program (LP) defined by system (B ∈
RM×N , f ∈ RM ) with M > N and set of indices I such
that:
F(B, f, I) = {x ∈ RN : Bix ≤ f i,∀i ∈ I}, (10)
where Bi is the i-th row of matrix B and f i is the i-th entry
of vector f . If follows from (10) that if I = {1, ...,M}, then
F(B, f, I) = {x : Bx ≤ f} = F(B, f).
Definition 1 (Non-redundant/Redundant Index). Index k ∈ I
is called non-redundant against set of indices I if F(B, f, I)
Fig. 1. Schematic representation of the equivalent description of a feasible
region F(B, f, I) by F(B, f, I∗) where I = {1, ...,M} is the set of all
indices of system (B, f¯) and I∗ ⊆ I is the essential set of indices.
changes when index k is removed from I:
k ∈ I is non-redundant iff F(B, f, I \ {k}) 6= F(B, f, I).
In analogy, index k ∈ I is called redundant if F(B, f, I)
does not change when k is removed from I:
k ∈ I is redundant iff F(B, f, I \ {k}) = F(B, f, I).
Definition 2 (Essential Set/Index). A set of indices
I∗ ⊆ {1, ...,M} is called essential to the system (B, f) if
it contains only non-redundant indices, i.e. no k ∈ I∗
can be removed from I∗ without changing F(B, f, I∗) and
F(B, f, I∗) = {x : Bx ≤ f}. Accordingly, any index k ∈ I∗
is called essential index.
Fig. 1 schematically illustrates a region F(B, f) defined by
a redundant system (B, f¯) and indicates the relation between
essential and non-essential indices.
A. Efficient Essential Set Identification
To identify essential set I∗, first we require a procedure that
determines whether or not index k is redundant in F(B, f, I).
Following [23, Proposition 8.5], k ∈ I is non-redundant if and
only if the LP
LP-Test(B, f, I, k): p∗ = max
x
Bkx (11a)
s.t. Bix ≤ f i ∀i ∈ I \ {k} (11b)
Bkx ≤ fk + 1 (11c)
has an optimal solution x∗ and the corresponding optimal
value p∗ is strictly greater than fk. Using the LP-Test as
given in (11), it is possible to identify essential set I∗ by
running LP-Test(B, f, I, k) with I = {1, ...,M} for all k ∈ I.
However, this requires solving a M -dimensional LP M times.
This complexity can be significantly reduced by populating I
iteratively with identified essential indices, instead of always
checking against complete set I = {1, ...,M}, [21], [23].
The resulting iterative process RedundancyRemoval is
illustrated in Fig. 2. The procedure takes system (B, f¯) and
an interior point z ∈ F◦(B, f) as input and returns set I∗ of
essential indices of system (B, f¯). If (B, f¯) corresponds to the
feasible region of the power flow problem, z = 0 is always
an interior point of F(B, f), because zero nodal injections
and, thus, zero-flows are always a solution to the power flow
equations. The procedure is initialized with empty set I = ∅,
which is iteratively filled with essential indices, and the full
set J = {1, ...,M}, which stores all indices that have to be
checked. First, the procedure randomly selects an unchecked
index k from J and solves the LP-Test(B, f, I ∪ {k}, k),
which returns p∗ and x∗ as per (11). If the LP-Test returns an
4Algorithm 1: RedundancyRemoval(B, f, z)
input : System of inequalities given by B and f ,
Interior point z
output: Returns the set I of non-redundant inequality
indices of the system Bx ≤ f
begin
I ← ∅; // Set of essential indices
J ← {1, ...,M}; // Indices to check
while |J | > 0 do
select an index k from J ;
(p∗, x∗)← solve LPTest(B, f, I ∪ {k}, k);
if ∃x∗ and p∗ > fk then
α← true;
j ← RayShoot(B, f, z, x∗);
// Returns an essential index
else
α← false;
end
if α then
I ← I ∪ {j}; // Update essential
J ← J \ {j}; // Remove checked
else
J ← J \ {k}; // Remove checked
end
end
return I
end
Fig. 2. Graphical (left) and algorithmic (right) itemization of essential set discovery procedure, where each row in the graphic corresponds to one iteration
step of the algorithm and each column corresponds to one specific task that is performed in each iteration (as given by the column headers). Gray lines
represent the constraints with indices to be checked, red lines represent the found essential constraints, blue solid lines represent the constraint that is checked
in the current iteration and blue dashed lines represent the corresponding relaxed constraint (fk + 1), see (11). (a) Initial state with J = {1, ...,M}, I = ∅
and z some interior point; (b) Some index k is selected from J and LP-Test(B, f, I, k) is performed; (c) Because I is empty in the initial iteration k is
always non-redundant against I and the most restricting constraint j in the direction of (x∗ − z) is added to I; (d) The next iteration starts with I now
containing one essential index; (e) Because k was non-redundant in the last step, it remains selected and LP-Test(B, f, I, k) is performed; (f) Now, k is again
non-redundant against I and the most restricting constraint j in the direction of (x∗ − z) is added to I; (g) The next iteration starts with I now containing
two essential indices; (h) Because k was non-redundant in the last step, it remains selected and LP-Test(B, f, I, k) is performed; (i) Index k is now redundant
against set I and is therefore removed from set J ; The procedure repeats until all elements have been removed from J .
optimal solution and p∗ > f¯k, then I does not yet contain the
index of a constraint that restricts F(B, f¯ , I) in the direction
of x∗ − z, see Fig. 2b). However, because set I is initialized
empty, indices can be non-redundant against I but not essential
to (B, f). In other words, there might exist a constraint with
index j in the direction of x∗− z that is more restrictive than
the constraint with index k. As shown in Fig. 2c), the auxillary
procedure RayShoot identifies the most restrictive constraint
in the direction of x∗ − z by shooting a ray from z in the
direction of x∗−z and returning index j of the first hyperplane
{x : Bjx = f j} that it crosses. See Appendix C for a detailed
description of RayShoot. This index j is guaranteed to be an
essential index of (B, f¯). Thus, j is added to I and removed
from J . Note that if j 6= k, then k remains in J to be checked
again, see Fig. 2e). If LP-Test(B, f, I ∪ {k}, k) determines k
to be redundant against I, see Fig. 2h), then k is guaranteed
to be not essential because I only contains essential indices.
In this case, no new essential index has been found and k is
removed from J , see Fig. 2i). The process is repeated until
J is empty. The resulting set I contains all essential indices
and therefore I = I∗. This essential set I∗ is a minimal
representation of the contingency feasible region, see (7), and
each essential index represents a specific critical line under a
specific outage and therefore can be denoted as a minimal set
of CBCOs.
While the complexity of the RedundancyRemoval re-
mains dominated by the LP-Test, it is now performed M times
with at most |I∗| constraints. The worst-case performance of
the RedundancyRemoval occurs when all essential indices
are immediately found in the first |I∗| iterations. Then, LP-
Test is performed |I∗| times with less then |I∗| constraints
and M − |I∗| times with |I∗| constraints. The RayShoot
procedure performs basic vector calculations in the RM×N
space and is performed |I∗| times. Its complexity is therefore
linear against MN and dominated by the complexity of LP-
Test.
Remark 2. The capacity of a line is independent from the di-
rection of the flow, thus the load flow constraints are identical
for the upper and lower bound and an essential set for the up-
per bound corresponds to an essential set for the lower bound.
Thus, it is sufficient to perform the RedundancyRemoval
only on the positive PTDF matrices to speed-up the essential
5Fig. 3. Illustration of two essential sets I∗ with and without considerations
for bounds on x: a) F(B, f, I∗) = {x : Bx ≤ f} b) F(B, f, I∗|(x,x)) =
{x ≤ x ≤ x : Bx ≤ f}
set identification.
B. Conditional Redundancy
The essential set identification as presented in previous Sec-
tion III-A only depends on redundancies that are inherent to
system (B, f¯), i.e. that are given by the power flow limits and
contingency scenarios as in (7)–(9). Thus, resulting essential
set I∗ contains all non-redundant indices assuming that x
is unbounded. While it is useful to find such a general
essential set, practical application usually includes specific
generation units, demand- and renewable time-series along
with the grid infrastructure. This allows to determine upper
and lower bounds for nodal injections xt. Considering bounds
on xt in the proposed algorithm, can render certain essential
indices unnecessary, because the specific allocation of nodal
injections to overload certain CBCOs will never occur given
the known technical limits. In other words, we can find a set
I∗|(x,x) ⊆ I∗ by bounding xt as schematically illustrated
in Fig. 3. Resulting set I∗|(x,x) is then sufficient to define
F(B, f) under the condition that x is bounded by (x, x):
F(B, f, I∗) = F(B, f, I∗|(x,x))
= {x ≤ x ≤ x : Bx ≤ f}. (12)
Bounds (x, x) strictly relate to the parameters and avail-
able data of the modeled system. In typical applications, the
modeled system remains static over T , so that implicit bounds
on nodal injections will always hold and a smaller essential
set will provide a reduction of model complexity without
compromising the validity of the resulting SCOPF. First, we
compute asymmetrical bounds by determining the maximum
positive and negative nodal injections:
xˇi = min(dt,i, t ∈ T ) + min(Migt, t ∈ T ) (13)
xˆi = max(Migt, t ∈ T ), (14)
where xˇi and xˆn are the maximum negative and maximum
positive nodal injection at n given the available demand and
generation parameters. Note that these bounds can be extended
to accommodate renewable in-feed time series or storage
capacities. However, as indicated in Remark 2, feasible region
F(B, f) is symmetric. Thus, bounds on x have to be included
symmetrically and we define:
−x = x = max(|xˇ|, |xˆ|). (15)
Using these bound to compute I∗|(x,x) will further reduce the
resulting problem size of the SCOPF (9).
IV. IMPACT SCREENING
The run-time of the RedundancyRemoval is directly re-
lated to the initial number of constraints M since each index
k ∈ {1, ...,M} has to be checked. It is therefore desirable
to reduce the number of constraints beforehand if possible.
As described in Section II-B, contingencies are considered by
computing how line flows are distributed across all other lines
in the case of an outage. Each line is only significantly affected
by an outage of its physical neighbors in close proximity, while
a large number of contingencies in greater electrical distance
have hardly any effect on its post-contingency power flow.
Consider the outage of a line o ∈ L. As per (3), LODFlo
determines how the pre-contingency power flow of line o is
distributed among all other lines l 6= o, l ∈ L. Because the
power flow on any line is bounded by f , the impact any line
outage can have on any other line is bounded by the respective
LODF multiplied with the maximum flow on this line:
|fot,l − f0t,l| = |LODFlo f0t,o| ≤ |LODFlo fo|. (16)
By reserving a small capacity margin η on each line, every
outage that impacts this line by less than η can be disregarded.
In other words, all rows PTDFol can be omitted if
LODFlo fo
f l
< η. (17)
effectively reducing the length of the input matrix B and there-
fore reducing the run-time of the RedundancyRemoval.
Depending on the implementation, chosen threshold η either
reflects a safety margin by reducing the available line capacity
(1 − η)f l or an allowable worst-case short-term overload
by virtually increasing the line capacity (1 + η)f l. Both
approaches, are typically used in practice to accommodate
parameter uncertainty, [24]. Note that this approach alters the
result of the SCOPF by creating an either slightly larger or
slightly smaller feasible region. This inaccuracy has to be
analysed and weighed against the benefit of the increased run-
time of the RedundancyRemoval for the specific problem
at hand.
V. CASE STUDY
We investigate the performance of the presented procedures by
running two numerical case studies. The first data-set is the
IEEE 118-bus system with 186 lines and line capacity infor-
mation taken from [25]. We consider all N-1 outage scenarios
that that the resulting number of constraints in the SCOPF
is 66, 216. This case provides a comprehensive summary of
the mechanics of the proposed constraint reduction process.
Second we use a larger 453-node data set of the German
transmission system (DE case) to showcase the performance
for common real-world multi-period applications. The DE case
comprises almost 2 million constraints related to its 995 lines.
Table I summarizes both cases.
We show four stages of constraint reduction that have been
used to solve the N-1 SCOPF. Stage “Full” considers all com-
binations of branches and outages in the positive halfspace,
i.e. no explicit constraint reduction has been applied beyond
ignoring the symmetry of the flow limits as discussed in
Remark 2. The “Pre” (preprocessed) stage includes the impact
screening as described in Section IV. The stages “RR” and
6TABLE I
OVERVIEW: CASE STUDIES
Nodes Lines Generators N-1 Flow Constraints
IEEE 118 118 186 116 66,2160
DE 453 995 4226 1,934,280
“CRR” apply the RedundancyRemoval procedure without
and with conditional redundancies, see Section III-B. Note
that those stages are presented here to itemize the effect
of the different parts of the reduction algorithm. For actual
application of the proposed method there is only one stage
to use, i.e. “CRR”. All results are compared in terms of the
resulting number of constraints and the corresponding time to
solve the optimal power flow model (6) using these constraints.
The computations have been performed on a standard PC
workstation with an Intel 8th generation i5 processor and
16GB memory. The optimal power flow model and the re-
duction procedures have been implemented in the open source
Power Market Tool (POMATO, [22]). The tool is written in
Python for data pre- and postprocessing and uses the Ju-
lia/JuMP package, [26], in combination with the Gurobi solver,
[27], as its optimization kernel. To allow direct comparison,
dual simplex was used and the presented times are the times
reported by the solver, including presolve.
A. IEEE 118-bus Case
Table II itemizes the number of constraints, the respective
solvetimes and objective values for all constraint reduction
stages in the IEEE 118-bus case. The OPF has been solved
for a single time step. For the preprocessing phase, the impact
screening margin set to η = 5 % which reduces the set of
constraints by 87 % to 4, 152 and thus reducing the solvetime
by 81 %. The small increase in the objective value (ca. 3 %) is
explained by the implicit line capacity reduction of the impact
screening margin, see Section V-C.
Running RedundancyRemoval further reduces this set
by 41% to 2, 465 and including conditional redundancy, as
described in Section III-B, yields a set of only 518 CBCOs,
that guarantee a N-1 SCOPF. Thus, instead of L relevant
contingencies for L lines we observe an average of 2.78
critical outages per line. This represents a total removal of
over 98 % of the constraints and results in a 97 % reduction
of the time needed to solve the problem. Furthermore, we
observe that the objective value remains unchanged after
the impact screening. This verifies, that the reduction due
to Algorithm 1 indeed only removes redundant constraints.
The process time of RedundancyRemoval for the 118-
bus case is around 7 min without and below 1 min with
conditional redundancy. This demonstrates, that the presented
algorithm is more efficient the more redundant the system is,
i.e. the fewer non-redundant constraints can be found. Note
that the reported process time refers to the runtime of the
RedundancyRemoval.
B. DE Case
The DE case solves a multi-period nodal market clearing for
the German power system including inter-temporal constraints
for energy storages. The power plant data is based on [28]
and the spacial distribution and grid topology is based on
TABLE II
IEEE 118-BUS CASE CONSTRAINT AND SOLVETIME REDUCTION
Full Pre RR CRR
# Constraints 33,108 4,152 2,465 518
Process Time [s] 396 64.9
Presolve [s] 3.84 0.45 0.27 0.07
Solvetime [s] 7.13 1.34 0.76 0.23
Objective 119,996 124,103 124,103 124,103
total constraint reduction: 87% 93% 98%
additional constraint reduction: 87% 41% 79%
total solvetime reduction: 81% 89% 97%
additional solvetime reduction: 81% 43% 70%
TABLE III
DE CASE CONSTRAINT REDUCTION
Full Pre RR CRR
# Constraints 967,140 14,523 10,695 2,629
Process Time [s] 136,495 11,719
total constraint reduction 98.5% 98.9% 99.7%
additional constraint reduction 98.5% 26% 75%
[29]. The large set of power plants is due to a detailed
regionalization of small scale, decentralized power plants. This
case represents a real world application with a prohibitively
large linear problem. Indeed, the the full set of constraints
cannot be solved by the computer hardware used for this case
study as the system runs out of memory before an optimal
solution has been obtained. While approaching the problem
with more powerful hardware might be able to overcome
this, the application of the proposed redundancy removal
procedures makes this problem solvable. Table III shows that
the “CRR” method removes 99.7 % of all constraints within
195 min processing time. The resulting average number of
critical outages per line is 2.64 which is surprisingly similar
to the 118-bus case. Preprocessing alone reduces the number
of constraints already by over 98 % with a impact screening
margin of η = 5 %. An additional 26 %, 75 % are achieved
by the RedundancyRemoval without and with conditional
redundancy, respectively. Again, the processing time of the
RedundancyRemoval itself is larger in the “RR” stage
relative to “CRR” as the problem is less redundant.
The resulting set of CBCOs is used to solve a N-1 SCOPF
for two time series of 10 and 24 time steps. The solvetimes
and objective values are itemized in Tables IV and V. As
there is no data for the “Full” stage, the time reductions are
reported relative to the “Pre” stage. While the problem was not
solvable with the full set of constraints, after “CRR” reduction
an optimal solution was found within 13.5 s for the 10-time
step run and 22.87 s for the 24-time step run. Compared to the
10-time step run, the 24-time step run shows a higher total time
reduction both absolute as well as relative to the constraint
reduction. This highlights the positive effect of the larger time
series, where the benefits of the constraint reduction apply in
every time step. All stages in the two runs result in exactly
the same objective value verifying the the removal of only
redundant constraints.
C. Impact Screening
As described in Section IV, the impact screening implicitly
reduces the available line capacity in favor of disregarding
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DE CASE SOLVETIME REDUCTION (RELATIVE TO PRE) FOR 10 TIME STEPS
Full Pre RR CRR
Presolve [s] NA 93.4 84.41 13.5
Solvetime [s] NA 283.19 250.29 44.82
Objective NA 2,993,021 2,993,021 2,993,021
total solvetime reduction: 12% 84%
additional solvetime reduction: 12% 82%
TABLE V
DE CASE SOLVETIME REDUCTION (RELATIVE TO PRE) FOR 24 TIME STEPS
Full Pre RR CRR
Presolve [s] NA 507.7 220.53 22.87
Solvetime [s] NA 1,707.56 714.37 89.53
Objective NA 8,764,696 8,764,696 8,764,696
total solvetime reduction: 58% 95%
additional solvetime reduction 58% 87%
outages which can not exceed this margin in case of an
outage. While this significantly reduces the number of con-
sidered contingencies, the available transfer capacity of the
network is reduced. The reduced network capacity correlates
with a higher objective value as cheaper generators are more
restricted to supply electrically distant nodes. To itemize the
effect of the choice of the margin η, the DE case 10-time step
run was repeated with different settings for η. Fig. 4 shows
the resulting number of CBCOs and objective values in the
optimal solution. The effect of η on the objective is closely
linear and we observe that an increase in η of 1 % translates
into a mild increase of the objective value of ca. 0.5 %. On
the other hand, the resulting amount of CBCOs is reduced
drastically already by small values of η. Those results highlight
how every outage in a meshed grid only has a certain reach
and that the number of outages relevant for a specific branch is
spatially restricted. Fig. 5 shows this effect by color-coding the
relative outage sensitivity of all lines in the network towards
the highlighted blue line. By showing all lines with an impact
of less then 1 % in gray, we see that mostly neighboring and
parallel lines in close proximity have a significant impact on
the highlighted line.
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Fig. 4. Effect of impact screening margin η on the resulting number of
CBCOs for the DE 10-time step case.
Fig. 5. Impact of outages towards the highlighted (blue) line; Grey lines
indicate a sensitivity of less then 1 %.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper proposed an efficient and scalable algorithm to find
the minimal set of constraints for fast solution of security con-
strained optimal power flow. The constraint reduction comes
with solvetime benefits that increase with longer time series.
The redundancy removal is computationally tractable and ad-
ditionally impact screening allows to filter specific line outages
without compromising security of operation to reduce the run-
time of the essential set identification. The necessary margins
for bounds and sensitivity of impact screening can be easily
attributed to margins used in practice. Further, we showed
that conditional redundancy improve constraint reduction as
well as process time and should be the preferred configuration
of usage. In case of line outages, the identified essential
constraints represents the set of critical branches under critical
outages. The proposed methods qualify to be used in a broad
variety of applications in techno-economic studies that rely on
an accurate and security constrained network representation,
e.g. studies on redispatch or flow based market coupling.
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APPENDIX
A. PTDF Derivation
Assuming that voltage magnitudes are fixed, phase angle dif-
ferences between neighbouring nodes are small and reactance
dominates resistance on all lines, the active power flow on line
l from node s to node r can be written in terms of the phase
angle difference between those nodes such that
ft,l = (xt,l)
−1(θt,s − θt,r), (A.1)
where θt,n is the voltage angle at node n at time t and we
define θt to collect all θt,n, n ∈ N . All nodal injections and
power flows are balanced such that:
xt,n =
∑
Ln
ft,l, (A.2)
where Ln is the set of lines connected to node n. Defining
incidence matrix A ∈ {−1, 0, 1}L×N such that all entries are
zero except A(l,n) = 1 if node n is the sending node of line l
and A(l,n) = −1 if n is the receiving node of line l (A.1) and
(A.2) can be written in their vector forms as
ft = X
−1Aθt = B(f)θt, (A.3)
xt = A
>X−1Aθt = B(n)θt, (A.4)
where diagonal matrix X ∈ FL×L collects line reactances such
that X(l,l) = bl,∀l ∈ L and B(f) ∈ RL×N , B(n) ∈ RN×N
is the line and bus susceptance matrix, respectively. Next,
because (A.1) is based on angle differences, we define a
reference (slack) node with fixed phase angle. Without loss
of generality we choose the index of the slack node to be
nslack = 1. Then B0 ∈ RL×N is defined by:
B0 = B(f)
[
0 0
0
(
B˜(n)
)−1] (A.5)
where B˜(n) ∈ SN−1 is the bus susceptance matrix without the
row and column associated with the slack bus (first row and
first column in our case).
B. LODF derivation
Given outage scenario c ⊆ L LODF ∈ RL×L can be
calculated as shown in [30]:
LODFc = B
0
c (I −B0c,c)−1 (B.1a)
where B0c,c is the |c| × |c| matrix collecting the rows and
columns of B0 corresponding to the outages in c and I is
the identity matrix of fitting dimensions.
C. Implementation of RayShoot
Algorithm 2: RayShoot(B, f, z, x∗)
input : System (B, f)
Interior point z
Point on or outside of feasible region x∗
output: Index of first inequality that limits a ray starting
at z in the direction of r
begin
H ← ∅; // Set of crossed hyperplanes
← init; // Set inital ray increment
r = x
∗−z
‖x∗−z‖2 ; // Set direction of ray
while |H| 6= 1 do
z ← z + r; // Add increment to ray
H ← {i | Biz > f i};
if |V| > 1 then
z ← z − r; // Go back one step
← /10; // Reduce step size
end
end
return H
end
